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Abstract
There is a general conception that positive associations to one’s trait, e.g. ‘I’m clever’, are
beneficial for cognitive performance. Scientific evidence shows that this is a simplification.
In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study we used written trial-based trait
feedback ‘you are clever’, or task feedback ‘your choice was correct’, on each correct re-
sponse of a rule-switching task, to investigate how the character of positive self-associa-
tions influences performance outcome. Twenty participants took part in this crossover
design study. We found that trait feedback was less beneficial for motivation and perfor-
mance improvement, and resulting in enhanced neural activation on more difficult bivalent
rule trials. This indicates that the task was treated as more complex in this condition. For ex-
ample, ‘you are clever’ feedback led to enhanced activation in anterior caudate nucleus, an
area known to process uncertainty. We further observed that activation in anterior paracin-
gulate cortex was sensitive to whether self-reflection was imposed by external feedback or
generated from internal processes, where the latter activation correlated positively with per-
formance when following after task feedback. Our results illustrate how feedback can evoke
self-reflections that either help or hinder motivation and performance, most likely by impact-
ing on processes of uncertainty. The results support social psychological models stipulating
that trait focus take resources away from task focus.
Introduction
Self-reflection is an inherent trait in humans and is there to enable predictions about one’s be-
haviour so that one can regulate attention and make informed choices [1]. In a review by Pas-
singham et al., [2], several examples from animal and human brain imaging studies were
presented which showed that external signals activate partly different neural processes, and dis-
plays different anatomical connectivity profiles, than do internal self-reflective processes.
While task processes take place in the lateral part of the cortex, internal processes are mainly
processed on the medial surface. When performing a cognitive task, such as a rule-switching
task where action relevant cues are visually presented, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is ac-
tive primarily in the learning stage, whereas activity in neurons of the premotor cortices and
caudate control the task once learned [3,4]. Likewise, there is now substantial support for a role
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for the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) in processing abstract representations of
abilities [5]. When participants reflect upon whether a trait applies to themselves or not,
aMPFC activity increases [6,7], or when trait words are processed as compared to non-trait
words [8].
Less is known about aMPFC activation during cognitive task performance. Having positive
associations to one’s traits is regarded beneficial for performance with the argument that a pos-
itive self-view helps with persistence on a task when facing difficulties [9]. A proposed mecha-
nism is that believing in one’s abilities generates a self-fulfilling prophecy, which influences
how we strive to achieve our goals [10]. Similarly, associations to being intelligent have been
found to increase the confidence in participants’memory process, as opposed to associations
to stupidity [11]. Furthermore, it has been found that when participants believe that their trait
is being evaluated, such as their intelligence, error-activation in the paracingulum of aMPFC
increases when performing a working memory task [12,13]. This suggests that aMPFC plays a
role in performance monitoring from a self-image perspective.
However, these latter studies are inconclusive as to whether it is beneficial for performance
accuracy to make associations with cleverness during task performance. In fact, negative effects
on performance and motivation as a consequence of a positive self-view have been reported
[14,15]. For example, a heightened self-view in the form of high achievement based self-esteem
can be a factor behind burnout symptoms [14]. Thus, it may be that the character of the posi-
tive self-association is important for performance outcome. There are two principal mind-sets
regarding intelligence which have been proposed to be particularly relevant for task motivation
and performance; the entity mind-set and the incremental mind-set [16]. A person holding an
entity mind-set perceives intelligence as something that is an unchangeable part of their char-
acter. An individual with an incremental mind-set on the other hand, regards intelligence as
something that can vary with effort and training. In turn, an incremental mind-set gives rise to
greater task motivation [17], and greater performance improvements when retested [18]. Stud-
ies on feedback have observed that praising intelligence can lead to reduced motivation, and
task persistence [19,20]. Although there are several behavioural studies on the topic of praising
trait and action, few studies have been looking at underlying neural mechanisms. In an EEG
study it was found that having an entity mind-set was related to enhanced P3 response to per-
formance-relevant feedback on errors as compared to incremental theorists. The error-related
P3-peak was most likely stemming from aMPFC [18].
Here we have extended the research to involve conflicts more generally by looking at correct
trials using a rule-switching task [21]. This task includes two levels of conflict; bivalent rules
and univalent rules. In bivalent rule trials, a response symbol has different meanings dependent
on the current rule active. It has been found that the response on bivalent correct trials, but not
on univalent trials, were influenced by which ability priming (clever or stupid) the participants
had received prior to the task [11]. We therefore chose this particular task to study the effect of
positive feedback related to trait and feedback related to choice of action. In this functional
magnetic resonance (fMRI) study, we investigated if trait focus and task focus could be manip-
ulated with feedback on correct responses in the rule-switching task. The aim was to study the
impact of the feedback on perceived experience, performance accuracy, and neural processes
with particular focus on the aMPFC. We used task feedback ‘your choice was correct’ that
praised participants’ choice, and trait feedback ‘you are clever’ that praised participants’ intelli-
gence in a within-subject design. We hypothesized that the trait feedback would evoke more
focus on one’s character with increased neural activation in paracingulate cortex of aMPFC as
a result [12,13], and lead to lowered motivation and performance [17,18]. Previous studies
show that individuals prone to anxiety tend to fear social feedback [22]. Other studies show
that feedback is perceived differently in participants with incremental or entity views on
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intelligence [18, 23]. We therefore also tested if self-esteem, mood, and growth mind-set influ-
enced how the feedback was processed.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty healthy participants (age 24±5.6, 8 females) were scanned with fMRI twice (18.5±6.45
days apart), in a crossover design. Two other participants were tested but excluded, one because
of performance below chance-level, the other for attending only one session.
Ethical statement
Participants gave written informed consent prior to testing. The study was approved by the
local ethics committee in Stockholm (EPN), Sweden (Dnr 2014/10-31/2). Participants were
neurologically healthy, right-handed, and with Swedish (n = 13) or English (n = 7) as their
mother tongue. They performed the task in their native language.
Rule-switching task
The participants took part in four scanning sessions, two sessions per visit, in a computer
based rule-switching task [21]. In the task, a rule symbol was presented on a computer screen
for 1000ms, followed by a blank screen for 500ms before a response symbol appeared. During
the presentation of the response symbol, the participants had a window of 2500ms to respond,
and received feedback immediately after the motor response (Fig 1). This was followed by jit-
tered delay of 1.5, 4 or 6 sec before presentation of the next rule symbol. This jittered delay was
introduced so as to separate (de-correlate) neural activations between the different trials, i.e.
neural activations evoked by the feedback in one trial and the neural activations evoked by see-
ing the rule symbol in the consecutive trial. The participants responded to symbols that could
be either univalent or bivalent by pressing the left or right button on a button box. The univa-
lent trials were associated with fixed responses, e.g. when a symbol of a bow (rule symbol) is
followed by a house (response symbol) a left key press is the correct answer, whereas a right
key-press is correct when a bow is followed by a car (Fig 1a). Bivalent trials refer to visual pic-
tures that were associated with different responses depending on one of the two rules possible.
For example, if a rule symbol consisting of a square is followed by the response symbol of a but-
terfly, the participants should press the left button. On the other hand, if the rule symbol is a
triangle and is followed by the same response symbol, a butterfly, the participant should press
the right button (Fig 1b and 1c). The task consisted of a distribution of 70% bivalent trials and
30% univalent trials with a distribution combination in accordance with earlier studies [11,21].
This distribution yields a fairly equal frequency of each rule; 35% presentations of each for the
two bivalent rules (Fig 1b and 1c), and a 30% occurrence of the univalent rule (Fig 1a). Univa-
lent trials served as controls and were later in the fMRI analysis subtracted from bivalent trials
in order to study brain activation related to conflicting trials. The univalent trials balance the
comparisons for visual input, and motor output. In addition, by subtracting brain activation re-
lated to univalent rule trials from brain activation related to bivalent rule trials, for each partici-
pant at each visit, we reduce the influence of confounding effects, such as equipment and
participant related effects, which may vary between the two scanning visits. The distribution of
univalent and bivalent trials was identical between the two scanning visits. The participants
were presented with a set of different symbols on each visit.
Practice. The task, with feedback, was practiced for 12 trials on a PC computer in a testing
room prior to fMRI scanning. If the participant’s accuracy was<60% they received task
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instructions again and practiced until achieving60% correct. Two participants gave<60%
correct responses on their first practice trial. Inside the scanner, the participants were familiar-
ized with the button box and the visual display for another 12 trials before data
collection started.
Feedback. Each scanning visit comprised of a feedback session (FS) followed by a no feed-
back session (NFS). During the FS, the feedback was presented immediately after each key-
press. The feedback was either task feedback ‘Your choice was correct’/’Du valde rätt’ (Swed-
ish), or trait feedback ‘You are clever’/‘Du är smart’ (Swedish) for corrects and ‘Wrong’/‘Fel’
Fig 1. Rule-switching task. A) A univalent rule trial. A rule symbol is presented followed by one of two unique response symbols. B-C) Two bivalent rule
trials. Two different rule symbols are used to determine the action to a subsequent response symbol. For example, when seeing the butterfly, either the left or
the right key should be pressed depending on preceding rule symbol. A-C) The feedback presented was either task feedback ‘your choice was correct’ or trait
feedback ‘you are clever’ for correct responses, and 'wrong' for incorrect responses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129714.g001
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(Swedish) for incorrect responses. During the NFS there was no feedback given neither on cor-
rects nor on errors. The FS consisted of 100 trials and the NFS consisted of 50 trials. Only one
of the feedbacks was given per visit. The order of which feedback type (task/trait) was received
on their first and second visit was counterbalanced among participants. The consequence of
the counterbalance is that the time confound of NFS always following FS does not affect the
comparison between the two feedback conditions ‘You are clever’ and ‘Your choice was cor-
rect’. Moreover, the identical number of trials between the two feedback conditions, and the
fact that we analyze the data with a 2x2 ANOVA, gives the unequal number of presentations
between FS and NFS, and univalent and bivalent trials, negligible impact on the results [24].
Questionnaires
Aminimum of one day before the experiment (mean 6.5±9.2 days), all participants filled in the
following questionnaires using Google forms; Burns depression inventory [25] and Rosenberg
self-esteem score [26], and four selected questions regarding intelligence mind-set orientation
[17]. The assessment of mind-set was calculated by subtracting the scores of the two entity ques-
tions from the scores of two incremental questions. The questions were answered by numbers
1–6; 1-Strongly disagree, 6-strongly agree. After subtraction, negative scores indicated agreement
with an incremental mind-set and positive scores indicated agreement with entity mind-set.
Motivation ratings
At three times during scanning, the participants rated their motivation, stress, and task difficul-
ty by answering three questions asked by the experimenter; How motivated are you to continue
with the task?; How stressed do you feel right now?; How difficult did you find the task? Rat-
ings were of 1–10; 1-very calm/unmotivated/easy, 10-very stressed/motivated/difficult. The
questions were asked before the cognitive task, after FS, and after NFS (difficulty ratings were
not given before the task). These are presented in Table 1. After the experiment, the partici-
pants wrote down how they experienced the feedback during the different sessions with the
questions; What did you think about the test with feedback? What did you think about the test
without feedback? They were subsequently debriefed about the purpose of the experiment.
Behavioural Data Analysis
The data was presented using Cogent software (UCL, London, UK) which is running in Matlab
(r2010a, The Math Works, MA, USA). Accuracy (% correct), reaction time (RT), motivation
scores, stress scores, and difficulty scores were analysed with repeated measures ANOVAs, and
Student’s paired t-tests for post-hoc comparisons in SPSS (SPSS Inc, Chicago, USA). We report
behavioural results from a 2x2 repeated measure ANOVA with the factors feedback (task/trait)
and time (FS/NFS). All the behavioural analyses were controlled for the order of which the par-
ticipants received each feedback type (day of testing). We further investigated if there were any
correlations between the outcome measures; accuracy, RT for correct responses, motivation
scores and the Burns/Rosenberg questionnaires, using Pearson correlations in SPSS.
Imaging acquisition
Functional imaging data were acquired using a 3T GE scanner (Discovery MR750, GE). Func-
tional images sensitive to blood oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) contrasts were acquired using
echo-planar imaging as T2-weighted images. Whole brain image volumes were built up from
contiguous oblique slices (n = 40), flip angle 90°, TR = 2600ms; TE = 30ms; FOV 28,8cm; ma-
trix size 6464; voxel size 2x2x2mm, slice thickness 3.0mm with 0.5mm gap. A high-resolution
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Table 1. Behavioural data.
Measure Feedback Session Score SD
Accuracy (percent correct) Trait FS 91.6 8.0
- NFS 95.4 8.2
Task FS 90.6 7.8
- NFS 97 2.9
Accuracy (bi) Trait FS 88.4 10.9
- NFS 94.4 9.2
Task FS 87.2 10.2
- NFS 96.5 3.0
Accuracy (uni) Trait FS 97.8 4.8
- NFS 97.1 7.0
Task FS 97.2 5.6
- NFS 97.9 3.5
RT correct (ms) Trait FS 686.7 169.8
NFS 629.3 167.8
Task FS 692 146
- NFS 637.2 152.8
RT correct (bi) Trait FS 744.2 208.2
NFS 624.9 165.2
Task FS 738.4 172.2
- NFS 638.9 158.6
RT correct (uni) Trait FS 590.5 129.7
NFS 639.0 176.4
Task FS 620.6 128.3
- NFS 633.8 148.4
Motivation scores (1–10) Trait before FS * 7.3 2.7
Trait after FS 6.6 2.5
- after NFS 5.9 2.9
Task before FS * 7.6 2.6
Task after FS 7.4 2
- after NFS 6.3 2.6
Stress scores (1–10) Trait before FS * 2.5 1.7
Trait after FS 2.5 1.3
- after NFS 2.2 1.6
Task before FS * 2.2 1.2
Task after FS 2.2 1
- after NFS 1.8 0.78
Difﬁculty scores (1–10) Trait after FS 2.5 1.4
- after NFS 2.4 1.5
Task after FS 2.8 1.5
- after NFS 2.2 1
Participants’ accuracy, reaction time on correct responses (RT) and subjective ratings of motivation, stress and difﬁculty. Average scores are presented
for the feedback sessions (FS) and the no feedback sessions (NFS) for task and trait feedback respectively. Motivation and stress scores were assessed
at three time points for each feedback type. Difﬁculty scores were assessed after FS and NFS. The scales ranged from 1–10 where low number indicated
low motivation/stress/difﬁculty.
* = practice was made with corresponding feedback.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129714.t001
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3D gradient-echo, T1-weighted anatomical image was also collected for each participant. We
used an 8-channel head coil.
Brain imaging data analysis
The fMRI data was analysed in SPM12b (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/, London, UK) [27]. The
first six volumes were discarded and the remaining volumes realigned to the first volume to
correct for head movements. Subsequently, the volumes were co-registered and normalized to
standard space using the Montreal Neurological Institute reference brain. The time series were
smoothed spatially with an isotropic Gaussian filter of 8 mm full width at half-maximum.
The fMRI data was modeled as an event-related design with regressors corresponding to bi-
valent, univalent, correct, and incorrect trials for the conditions with immediate feedback
(trait/task) (FS) and for the subsequent conditions without feedback (NFS), for each scanning
visit. The events of the trials (bivalent/univalent and correct/incorrect) were time-locked to the
presentation of the rule symbol, and the key response.
Whole brain statistical parametric maps were calculated for these event-related condition-spe-
cific effects with the general linear model. The vectors were convolved with a canonical hemody-
namic response function, and the data were high-pass filtered with a frequency cut-off of 128 sec.
The subject-specific effects were taken up to a second-level full-factorial analyses based on
summary statistics from the contrast-images created on the first level, using 2 factors with 2
levels each; rule (univalent/bivalent) and condition (task/trait). Due to the low number of error
trials we excluded the factor outcome.
We investigated the main effect of bivalent trials, main effect of condition (task/trait), and
interactions between rule (bivalent/univalent) and condition (task/trait) where we present both
cross-over (co) and one-way (ow) results. This was done for both the FS and the NFS. We also
investigated the interaction between condition (task/trait) and time (FS/NFS). The analyses
were focused on the event that was locked to the time of seeing the rule symbol, as well as at the
time of pressing the key i.e. seeing the feedback.
We also investigated if BOLD was related to motivation scores, stress scores, difficulty
scores as measures in between the FS and NFS, and performance accuracy for the following
conditions: BOLD at the event of seeing the bivalent rule symbol, and at the event of seeing the
feedback, in the trait feedback and task feedback conditions during the FS and NFS. For this
purpose, we added each rating separately as a covariate in second level SPM analyses. Because
we tested four different outcome measures, we then corrected the p-values for multiple com-
parisons with Bonferroni’s corrections.
In order to test for significance, we carried out whole brain Family Wise Error corrected sta-
tistics (p<0.05) (Table 2). In Table 3, we also present results on p<0.001 uncorrected level. To
investigate if the activations found on the uncorrected level fell within task specific areas, we
applied a mask generated from the activation pattern of the contrast: Main effect Rule (bivalent
vs univalent) whole brain corrected. To test the hypothesis of feedback sensitive activity in
aMPFC we carried out restricted region of interest (ROI) analyses based on previous findings
of paracingulate cortex (-10 50 30) [12,13]. We report results corresponding to ROIs in the
shape of a sphere with a radius 6mm, p-value<0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons
(FWE). Anatomical locations were verified using the atlas of Duvernoy [28].
Results
Behavioural results
Questionnaires. We found a correlation between Burns depression scores and Rosenberg
self-esteem scores (Pearson correlations, r = 0.87, p = 0.001) where the lower the self-esteem
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the more negative mood. When correlating ratings on Burns depression inventory and Rosen-
berg’s self-esteem scale with motivation ratings during the scanning, performance accuracy, or
RT, we did not find any significant correlations (Pearson correlations r<0.1, p>0.05). When
analyzing participants’ incremental and entity views on intelligence we found twelve partici-
pants holding an incremental view and seven participants holding an entity view. One partici-
pant got a score of zero, meaning neither nor. There was no significant interaction between
mind-set and feedback on accuracy (F(1,16) = 0.387, p = 0.543, two-tailed), nor RT, (F(1,16) =
0.861 p = 0.769, two-tailed). There was a significant interaction between mind-set and feedback
when looking at motivation (F(1,16) = 6.040, p = 0.026, two-tailed). Motivation score in partici-
pants with an entity mind-set was 5.43±3.04 after trait-feedback (FS) and 8.14±1.86 after action
feedback (FS) (t(18) = 2.03, p = 0.09, two-tailed). Motivation score in participants with an incre-
mental mind-set was 7.25±2.05 after trait feedback (FS) and 6.91±2.15 after action feedback
(FS), (t(18) = 0.87, p = 0.4, two-tailed).
Accuracy. The behavioural data revealed a significant effect of time (FS or NFS) on accura-
cy (F(1,18) = 6,24, p = 0.02, Fig 2a and 2b). The post-hoc analysis showed that accuracy was
higher in the NFS than the FS both in the trait-feedback sessions (t(19) = 4.7, p = 0.017) and in
the task-feedback sessions (t(19) = 2.6, p = 0.0001). Overall, accuracy was significantly higher
for univalent trials compared to bivalent trials trials during FS (F(2,18) = 31.18, p = 0.001) and
during NFS (F(2,18) = 8.796, p = 0.008) (Table 1). We observed an effect of feedback when look-
ing at accuracy improvement (NFS accuracy—FS accuracy) from FS to NFS, over all correct tri-
als (Fig 2a and 2b). Task-feedback lead to a greater improvement than trait-feedback when
looking at time(FS/NFS)feedback (task/trait), (F(2,18) = 3.550, p = 0.038, one-sided), where
task-feedback had an average increase of 6.4% SD±6.5, and trait-feedback gave an increase of
3.8% SD±6.0. Looking only at the bivalent trials, again there was a significant improvement in
favour of task feedback (time(FS/NFS)feedback (task/trait), F(2,18) = 3.907, p = 0.032, one-
sided). This effect was absent for univalent trials (time(FS/NFS)feedback (task/trait), F(2,18) =
0.423, p = 0.26, one-sided) (Table 1).
Table 2. Brain activations at a statistical threshold of p<0.05 FWE-whole brain corrected.
Rule symbol (FS) Contrast Area Side x y z t-score
trait + task bi-uni Mid frontal g L -26 8 50 5.13
Mid ACC R 10 22 36 5.71
Insula R 34 22 2 6.57
Caudate L -14 6 0 7.62
Caudate R 12 8 -4 7.79
Putamen R 26 18 -2 6.22
Thalamus R 6 -14 8 5.45
Precuneus L -8 64 42 5.44
Angular g R -38 -54 36 5.26
Calcarine s L -12 -74 14 5.22
Trait > task co bi-uni Middle front g R 26 6 36 5.09
Caudate R 24 20 18 5.39
Trait > task ow bi-uni Caudate/putamen L -22 18 -12 5.09
Task>trait n/a
Brain activations at whole brain FWE corrected (p<0.05) level. Activations were seen when the participants were viewing the bivalent rule symbols in the
conditions where they got the feedback ‘You are clever’. Bi—bivalent trials, uni—univalent trials, co—crossover interaction, ow—oneway analysis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129714.t002
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Table 3. Brain activations at a statistical threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected. Brain activation at uncorrected (p<0.001) statistics for feedback session
(FS) and no feedback session (NFS) at the event of seeing the rule symbols and at the event of making a key press/seeing the feedback ‘you are clever’ and
‘your choice was correct’, for bivalent trials (bi) and univalent trials (uni) trials. co—cross-over analysis, ow—one way analysis.
Rule symbol (FS) Contrast Area Side x y z t-score
trait > task co bi—uni Middle front g R 26 6 36 5.09
Central s R 20 -44 50 4.81
Caudate L -16 14 22 3.32
Caudate R 24 20 18 5.36
Cerebellum L 12 -66 -40 3.6
trait > task ow bi—uni Mid front g L -28 6 48 3.78
Mid front g R 26 2 40 3.95
ACC L/R 10 24 36 4.66
ACC L/R -12 20 28 4.07
Orb front g R 16 54 -6 3.9
Caudate/putamen L -22 18 -12 5.09
Caudate/putamen R 14 10 0 4.91
Precuneus -8 -64 42 4.7
Inf parietal g L -36 -56 32 3.51
Mid occipital g R 22 -76 12 3.99
Vermis -12 -48 -40 3.5
trait > task bi + uni Insula R 38 8 -8 3.5
Insula R 32 -12 20 3.31
Amygdala L -20 -4 -16 3.67
task > trait co bi—uni Insula L -46 4 -10 3.29
task > trait ow bi—uni Central g L -22 -42 74 3.68
Globus Pallidus L -14 2 -4 3.83
Globus Pallidus R 10 6 -6 3.84
Rule symbol (NFS) Contrast Area Side x y z t-score
trait > task co bi—uni Frontopolar g M -2 64 -8 3.38
Caudate L -10 10 20 3.77
Angular g L -48 -68 26 3.48
Angular g R 48 -60 18 3.47
Inf temporal g L -62 -10 -16 3.19
Cerebellum R 40 -74 -38 3.52
trait > task ow bi-uni Mid front g L -24 24 58 3.81
Precentral g R 18 -18 56 4.9
Sup marg g L 50 -60 16 3.94
trait > task bi + uni Inf frontal g L -58 6 36 3.12
Precentral g R 26 -14 56 3.24
Precuneus R 12 -58 50 3.51
task > trait co bi—uni Ant calcar s L -16 -46 8 3.57
Response symbol (FS) Contrast Area Side x y z t-score
trait > task co bi—uni Inf frontal g R 48 32 -2 3.32
Sup temp g L -46 6 -10 3.24
trait > task ow bi—uni Inf frontpol s R 28 56 -4 3.43
Inf front g R 50 15 -8 3.4
Lat cerebellum R 42 -68 -30 3.39
trait > task bi + uni Central s R 24 -46 54 3.59
Temporal pole R 46 16 -36 3.53
(Continued)
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Table 3. (Continued)
Mid occip g L -34 -80 -6 3.16
task > trait co bi—uni Cuneus L -8 -98 14 3.25
task > trait ow bi—uni Putamen R 26 -10 20 3.77
Lat cerebellum L -28 -64 -40 3.74
Lat cerebellum R 30 -62 -42 3.76
Response symb (NFS) Contrast Area Side x y z t-score
trait > task co bi—uni Ant calcar s L -16 -46 8 4.47
Cerebellum L -24 -48 -38 3.32
trait > task ow bi—uni Occ g L -28 -80 0 3.79
Occ g R 22 -82 2 3.59
Vermis R 12 -50 -22 3.43
trait > task bi + uni Sup frontal g R -16 22 42 3.92
Sup/med front g R -8 32 48 2.42
Angular g R 52 -36 8 3.24
task > trait co bi—uni Caudate L -10 12 18 4.01
Insula L -40 18 12 3.69
Rule symb (FS-NFS) Contrast Area Side x y z t-score
trait > task co bi Thalamus R 26 -10 22 3.74
trait > task ow bi Mid frontal g R 20 14 68 4.47
Angular g L -42 -48 36 3.76
Thalamus R 26 -12 22 3.51
task > trait n/a
Resp symb (FS-NFS) Contrast Area Side x y z t-score
trait > task ow bi Rost ACC -4 40 20 3.94
Precentral g L -56 -18 44 3.82
task > trait co bi Central s L -60 -6 40 3.57
Putamen R 32 10 0 3.52
Vermis -4 -72 -24 3.98
Cerebellum R 24 -64 -26 3.74
task > trait ow bi Mid front g R 48 8 50 3.54
Vermis -10 -36 -26 3.94
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129714.t003
Fig 2. Performance improvement andmotivation scores for task and trait-feedback during FS and NFS. A) Both feedback conditions resulted in
performance improvement from FS to NFS. B) Task-feedback led to greater improvement compared to trait-feedback (NFS vs. FS). C) The participants were
more motivated to continue with the task after task-feedback compare to trait-feedback.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129714.g002
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Reaction time. There was a significant effect of time (FS/NFS) on RT for correct responses
(F(2,18) = 29.32, p = 0.0001). RT was slower in FS than NFS for both task and trait-feedback. Bi-
valent trials were slower than univalent trials in FS (F(2,18) = 51.1, p = 0.001), but there was no
difference between bivalent and univalent trials in NFS (F(2,18) = 0.34, p = 0.57). There was a
trend for a difference between condition (task/trait) and trial type (bivalent/univalent) (F(1,18)
= 3.305, p = 0.086, two-sided), where the participants tended to slow the bivalent trials in the
trait feedback condition (Table 1).
Motivation ratings. There was a main effect of feedback on motivational scores (F(1,18) =
6.244, p = 0.022). After the task-feedback FS, motivation scores were significantly higher than
after trait-feedback FS (task-feedback: 7.4±2.03; trait-feedback 6.65±2.50, F(1,18) = 6.2, p = 0.01,
one-tailed) (Fig 2c). There was no main effect of time (FS/NFS) on motivational scores (F(1,18)
= 0.71, p = 0.50), nor a difference in motivation before the scanning started between the two
visits (t(19) = 1.65, p = 0.21) (Table 1).
Stress ratings. There was a significant effect of feedback on stress scores as measured after
the FS and NFS (F(1,18) = 14.69, p = 0.001), where task-feedback induced less stress than trait-
feedback. There was also a significant interaction between feedback and order (F(1,18) = 12.13,
p = 0.003), where stress scores were higher on the first visit both after FS and NFS compared to
the second visit, when receiving trait-feedback. There was no effect of time (FS/NFS) on stress
scores (F(1,18) = 2.355, p = 0.13).
Difficulty ratings. There was no effect of feedback on difficulty scores, (F(1,18) = 0.22,
p = 0.65), nor time (FS/NFS) (F(1,18) = 1.32, p = 0.27).
Debriefing. The following data was revealed from the debriefing about feedback experi-
ences. In regard to task-feedback (FS), 75% of the participants were positive, 20% negative, and
5% neutral. In regard to NFS following the task-feedback, 70% were positive, 25% negative,
and 5% neutral. In regard to trait-feedback (FS), 30% were positive, 45% negative, and 25%
neutral. In regard to NFS following trait-feedback, 60% were positive, 20% negative, and 20%
neutral. Thus, trait related feedback was most disliked. Positive views typically included ‘nice’,
‘motivating’, or ‘it was good’. Negative views typically included ‘distracting’, ‘annoying’, or
‘repetitive’.
Brain activation. The left anterior caudate nucleus was more active at the event of seeing
the bivalent rule symbol in the FS in the condition where the participants were presented with
the feedback ‘you are clever’, as compared to the condition where they received the feedback
‘your choice was correct’. This was revealed both in a cross-over and in a one-way analysis be-
tween rule (bivalent vs. univalent) and condition (trait vs. task) (24 20 18, t = 5.39, p = 0.014;
-22 18 -12, t = 5.09, p = 0.036 FWE whole brain corrected) (Fig 3, Table 2). Brain activations at
a lower statistical threshold (p<0.001 uncorrected) are presented in Table 3. We note that cau-
date activation was not seen to differ between the two feedback types when contrasting FS biva-
lent trials to NFS bivalent trials (trait [FS-NFS] vs. task [FS-NFS] and vice versa) (Table 3).
This suggests that the effect of feedback is more pronounced on bivalent trials and less so on
univalent trials. This finding is in line with the accuracy and RT data, which show feedback de-
pendent differences for bivalent trials but not univalent trials.
None of the ratings regarding perceived quality (stress/motivation/difficulty) correlated
with BOLD in this area for the feedback condition ‘you are clever’.
When investigating activity of the paracingulate cortex of aMPFC specifically, again we
found increased activation in particular when the rule symbol was presented for the feedback
condition ‘you are clever’. Seeing the rule symbol during the FS was reflected as enhanced activ-
ity when investigating main effect trait vs. task (bivalent + univalent) (12 52 28, t = 2.46,
p<0.05 corr 4mm ROI) (Fig 4a and 4b). Seeing the rule symbol during the NFS was reflected
as enhanced activity when investigating the interaction between rule (bivalent vs. univalent)
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and condition (trait vs. task) (6 50 26, t = 2.76, p<0.05 corr ROI), as well as in the simple con-
trast trait bivalent rule vs. trait univalent rule (6 50 28, t = 3.08, p<0.02 corr ROI). None of the
quality ratings correlated with BOLD in this area for the condition ‘you are clever’. Instead,
there was a significant positive correlation between BOLD and performance accuracy at the
event of seeing the bivalent rule symbol, in the NFS following ‘your choice was correct’ (16 50
30, t = 4.26, p<0.008 Bonferroni corrected, ROI).
At the time of seeing the feedback, there was no activation surviving the conservative statis-
tical threshold of correcting for multiple comparisons in the whole brain. We observe however,
that at the threshold p<0.001 uncorrected, there is more activity when seeing the feedback ‘you
are clever’ as compared to ‘your choice was correct’ (Table 3). Increased activations when see-
ing the feedback ‘you are clever’ vs. ‘your choice was correct’ in bivalent trials as compared to
univalent trials, were found in right inferior frontal gyrus (48 32 -2, t = 3.32) and left superior
temporal gyrus (-46 6 -10, t = 3.24). Increased activation when seeing the feedback ‘your choice
was correct’ vs. ‘you are clever’ in bivalent trials as compared to univalent trials, was observed
in cuneus (-8 -98 14, t = 3.25). In the NFS, at the time of the response, which is the time when
the feedback was presented in the first part of the scanning session, activation increased in the
Fig 3. Brain activation in left anterior caudate nucleus when seeing rule symbols. A) Activity increased at the event of seeing the bivalent rule symbols
in FS for ‘you are clever’. B) % BOLD signal change for each condition and rule type.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129714.g003
Fig 4. Brain activation in anterior paracingulate cortex when seeing rule symbols. A) % BOLD signal change for each condition and rule type. B)
Activity increased in the trait condition compared to task condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129714.g004
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visual cortex (anterior calcarine sulcus, -16 -46 8, t = 4.47) and cerebellum (-24 -48 -38,
t = 3.32). This was seen for the contrast comparing activation during ‘you are clever’ to ‘your
choice was correct’ in bivalent trials as compared to univalent trials. On the other hand, the
condition ‘your choice was correct’ vs. ‘you are clever’ (bivalent trials vs. univalent trials) gave
rise to left caudate (-10 12 18, t = 4.01) and left insular cortex (-40 18 12, t = 3.7) activation
increase.
Discussion
We found that trial-based written feedback influenced participants’ perceived experience and
their performance. The participants were more motivated to continue with the task after the FS
‘your choice was correct’ than after the FS ‘you are clever’. They also perceived less stress in the
‘your choice was correct’ condition, and showed a significantly greater improvement in accura-
cy from FS to NFS. In the debriefing after the testing, nine of the participants expressed nega-
tive views about the feedback ‘you are clever’, whereas only four participants reported negative
views about the task feedback. Thus, although both feedback types informed the participants
about their correct outcome, the one addressing a trait gave rise to a more negative experience.
This result is in line with a number of previous behavioural studies observing that trait-focused
feedback has a negative effect on mainly motivation, but also on performance [16–18,29,30].
Interestingly, in the ‘you are clever’ condition we observed enhanced activation for the biva-
lent rule trials in particular. Mostly at the time when the bivalent rule symbol was presented.
This means that the feedback-induced effects influence task monitoring. When looking at the
simple, univalent trials the difference between the feedback types cease to appear. For example,
we observed significantly greater activation in caudate nucleus for bivalent trials in the condi-
tion ‘you are clever’ than in the condition ‘your choice was correct’, but there was no difference
between the two conditions when it came to the univalent trials. Related finding was made
when looking at the behavioural data; RT and accuracy, where no difference was seen between
feedback conditions in how univalent trials were treated, but more so when studying bivalent
trials. We also looked at the bivalent trials during FS when using NFS bivalent trials as a con-
trol, to investigate if caudate was more active as a function of the actual feedback. There was no
support for such a process, which strengthen the notion that more complex bivalent, rather
than simple univalent trials, are targets for effects induced by the feedback. Similar observa-
tions have been made previously in that trait associations are particularly influential on neural
activity and behaviour during events of uncertainty, such as errors or bivalent rule cues [11–
13,18]. The results suggest that the ‘You are clever’ feedback does not induce active and con-
stant thoughts regarding one’s trait. Rather, it seems that the feedback influences processes that
impacts on neurotransmitter levels so that, in moments of uncertainties, the neurons are sig-
naling differently. The most likely neurons to be affected by the feedback are the one’s sensitive
to dopamine. This is so because the caudate nucleus is known to innervate high densities of do-
pamine sensitive neurons [31,32] and uncertainty is reflected in dopamine signals [33, 34].
Uncertainty is a measure of the quality of the participant’s own estimate of the data [35].
Poor quality can be due to that not enough data has been collected [35], or because of poor
confidence in the memory for data presented [11]. The latter would be the likely explanation in
the present context as the two feedback conditions ‘You are clever’ and ‘Your choice was cor-
rect’ did not differ in the number of data presentations. Reduced confidence in memory could
be due to factors such as anxiety, more demanding interpretation of the feedback, or deviation
from task focus. Increased caudate activation has previously been observed when individuals
anticipate the value of outcomes [36], where participants with social anxiety show higher acti-
vation in caudate nucleus in anticipation to a performance outcome compared to controls
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[37,38]. Individuals may be more sensitive to information regarding their character (clever as
opposed to correct action). According to the processing efficiency theory [39], anxiety makes
us use compensatory strategies, such as increased effort, in order to perform well. Another pos-
sibility to the observed feedback effects could be that the participants have to engage in a two-
step interpretation process in the ‘you are clever’ condition. They need to translate ‘you are
clever’ into ‘I made the correct choice’, which requires extra neuronal resources. It has previ-
ously been observed that trial-to-trial feedback with low additional information content dis-
tracts task attention [40]. A third possible explanation to the observed effects of the feedback is
that of a model in social psychology which proposes that attentional shift from action to trait
leads to performance impairments due to reduced cognitive resources for the task [41]. For ex-
ample, working memory capacity has been found to be influenced by how we think about our
abilities [42]. Here, the authors induced the stereotypic belief that women are inferior to men
in mathematics. Participants receiving the stereotypic framing in this study did not differ in
math scores compared to a control group, but the men and women in the primed group took
longer time on the math equations and had higher concerns about how the researcher would
rate their performance compared to the control group. The main aim of the study however,
was to look at how participants performed on a working memory task which was incorporated
between the math equations. Results on the working memory task revealed that the women in
the stereotypic group recalled fewer words when compared to a control group of women. This
implies that the threat of belonging to a negative stereotype makes participants reflect upon
themselves and their abilities, which then interferes with attentional resources needed for the
working memory task. Furthermore, Bengtsson and Penny [11] developed a model of the rule-
switching task after participants had been primed with association to ‘clever’ and ‘stupid’. The
model is based on the current understanding that neuronal populations estimate prior proba-
bilities of outcomes and their expected value. In short, the model stipulates that the individual,
by using Bayesian inference, attributes the probability of the cause of a response outcome (cor-
rect/error) to either a me-process or a task-process. Associations to ‘clever’ led to enhanced
me-focus during correct responses.
When investigating activity in paracingulate cortex, we made two observations. Firstly, we
found that this area was more active in the ‘you are clever’ condition during the FS. Secondly,
in the absence of feedback, in the NFS following ‘your choice was correct’, we found that partic-
ipants’ performance accuracy correlated positively with BOLD here. These observations were
made at the event when they were viewing the bivalent rule symbols. Our results strengthen
the notion that this area is involved in self-focused processes during cognitive performance
[12,13]. However, these new findings suggest that activation in paracingulate cortex is sensitive
to whether external information about oneself is presented, or if the individual relies on inter-
nal self-monitoring.
We further investigated if aspects such as self-esteem, mood, and growth mind-set impacted
on how the feedbacks were processed. We found no support for that self-esteem or mood influ-
enced the perception of the feedback. Nor did we observe any effects on accuracy and reaction
time in the interactions between feedback and growth mind-set. We noted that there was a ten-
dency for task feedback (your choice was correct) to be particularly beneficial for motivation in
individuals with an entity view on intelligence. This could be interpreted in line with the pre-
dictions of Dweck et al., (2004) [23] stipulating that entity theorists are more concerned about
their outcome whereas incremental theorists are more interested in the knowledge acquired.
Although what has been observed previously is a difference between the two mind-sets when
processing negative feedback [18]. The current sample sizes are very small and therefore we are
making observations but not drawing any conclusions regarding how a growth mind-set is
influencing this type of feedback.
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We made the decision to scan the participants with 2–3 weeks apart, randomly distributed
between the two conditions. This time span was implemented to reduce the influence of the
memory from previous visit on the current. It may be that the time factor influences the results
because of for example equipment and participant related effects. However, in the brain imag-
ing analysis, for each participant and visit, we subtracted brain activation related to univalent
rules from brain activation related to bivalent rules, which lessens the influence of such con-
founding effects that may vary between the two scanning visits.
Conclusion
This work sheds light on differences between the self-reflections; trait and action. It turned out
that trait feedback was less beneficial for motivation and performance improvement. As a re-
sult, activity in caudate nucleus was enhanced in conflicting trials in the trait feedback condi-
tion particularly. We observed further that anterior paracingulate cortex activation was
sensitive to whether self-reflection was imposed by external feedback or generated from inter-
nal processes, and that the latter activity supported performance when followed after task feed-
back. It should be noted however that these brain areas, which we found differentially active in
the two feedback conditions, were most likely not directly differentiating between trait and ac-
tion per se. Instead, their activation reflected the influence the feedback had on attention or
task uncertainty.
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